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summary
Between December 2013 and April 2016, the larg-
est epidemic of Ebola virus disease (EVD) to date 
generated more than 28,000 cases and more than 
11,000 deaths in the large, mobile populations 
of Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. Tracking 
the rapid rise and slower decline of the West 
African epidemic has reinforced some common 
understandings about the epidemiology and con-
trol of EVD but has also generated new insights. 
Despite having more information about the geo-
graphic distribution of the disease, the risk of 
human infection from animals and from survi-
vors of EVD remains unpredictable over a wide 
area of equatorial Africa. Until human exposure 
to infection can be anticipated or avoided, future 
outbreaks will have to be managed with the 
classic approach to EVD control — extensive 
surveillance, rapid detection and diagnosis, com-
prehensive tracing of contacts, prompt patient 
isolation, supportive clinical care, rigorous efforts 
to prevent and control infection, safe and digni-
fied burial, and engagement of the community. 
Empirical and modeling studies conducted dur-
ing the West African epidemic have shown that 
large epidemics of EVD are preventable — a 
rapid response can interrupt transmission and 
restrict the size of outbreaks, even in densely 
populated cities. The critical question now is 
how to ensure that populations and their health 
services are ready for the next outbreak, wherever 
it may occur. Health security across Africa and 
beyond depends on committing resources to both 
strengthen national health systems and sustain 
investment in the next generation of vaccines, 
drugs, and diagnostics.
Sc ale of the Epidemic
Between December 2013 and April 10, 2016, a 
total of 28,616 suspected, probable, and con-
firmed cases of Ebola virus disease (EVD) were 
reported, although the true toll of the epidemic, 
especially the number of deaths, was probably 
greater. A total of 11,310 deaths was recorded, 
but the true toll was certainly greater. By far the 
largest numbers of cases and deaths occurred in 
Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, but an addi-
tional 36 cases were also reported from Italy, 
Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Spain, the United King-
dom, and the United States.1 After reaching a 
peak of 950 confirmed cases per week in Sep-
tember 2014, the incidence dropped markedly 
toward the end of that year. But it took much 
longer to stop all chains of transmission: the 
outbreaks in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea 
ended in May, November, and December 2015, 
respectively, although additional cases of EVD, 
probably arising from virus persisting in the tis-
sues and body fluids of survivors, have contin-
ued to be reported in all three countries.
As case numbers mounted through 2014 and 
2015, many questions emerged about the epide-
miology of EVD, the medical and social effects 
of the disease, and the tools and techniques re-
quired to control the epidemic. What was the 
origin of human infection in West Africa? Why 
did this outbreak become the largest Ebola epi-
demic ever recorded? What are the most effective 
methods of control? This report addresses these 
questions, with a view to better understanding 
the 2013–2016 epidemic and to preventing large 
outbreaks in the future.
Origins of Human Infec tion 
in West Afric a
Since 1976, and before the recent epidemic, there 
were 23 known Ebola outbreaks in equatorial 
Africa (see the Supplementary Appendix, available 
with the full text of this article at NEJM.org). The 
first reported human case in the 2013–2016 epi-
demic involved a 2-year-old boy living in the 
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village of Meliandou in Guéckédou prefecture, 
a forested region of southeastern Guinea.2 In a 
retrospective investigation, it was reported that 
he had become ill on December 26, 2013, and 
had died 2 days later. The infection was caused 
by Zaire ebolavirus species. Its origin remains un-
certain, but it is likely to have originated in an 
animal, possibly a bat (see the Supplementary 
Appendix).
Spread of Ebol a in Guinea , 
Liberia ,  and Sierr a Leone
Although the first case of human infection was 
probably acquired from an animal, all subsequent 
cases are likely to have arisen from human-to-
human transmission.3 The main route of EVD 
transmission, in this as in previous outbreaks, was 
direct personal contact with the blood or other 
body fluids of a person with symptomatic disease 
(see the Supplementary Appendix). Viral RNA has 
also been detected by means of reverse-transcrip-
tase–polymerase-chain-reaction assay and isolated 
from the body fluids of asymptomatic survivors, 
notably semen and breast milk, both of which 
represent additional, persistent sources of infec-
tion whose infectiousness decreases over time.4-7
By March 2014, infection had spread within 
Guinea to the Kissidougou and Macenta prefec-
tures (which neighbor Guéckédou) and, in the 
week of March 10 (week 11 of 2014), Ebola virus 
was reported for the first time in a West African 
capital city — Conakry (Fig. 1). A surge in trans-
mission in Guinea during March and April 2014 
(weeks 10 through 18) generated more than 100 
new cases in total, and the failure to interrupt 
transmission allowed infection to become more 
fully entrenched in the southeastern part of the 
country. From there, infection spread farther 
within Guinea and across the nearby national 
boundaries. The disease appeared in Lofa and 
Margibi counties in northern Liberia before the 
end of March and in the Kailahun district in 
eastern Sierra Leone during May.
Even though human infection probably origi-
nated in Guinea, marked increases in case inci-
dence at the three-country epicenter occurred 
first in the eastern region (administrative level 1) 
of Sierra Leone and next in North Central Liberia, 
followed by Nzérékoré in Guinea. At the western 
border between Guinea and Sierra Leone, despite 
frequent cross-border movements of infected 
people, changes in the incidence of Ebola were 
synchronized among prefectures within Guinea 
(Conakry, Coyah, Forécariah) but not with the 
adjacent district in Sierra Leone (Kambia) (Fig. 2A). 
Thus, infection crossed national borders but, in 
these examples, not so frequently that districts 
in Sierra Leone and prefectures in Guinea acted 
as a single, homogeneous mixing unit.
Phylogenetic analysis provided valuable addi-
tional information about the origins of the virus 
and the migration of infected people.3,8,9 Genom-
ic analysis has shown that the West African epi-
demic probably arose after a single introduction 
from an animal reservoir; the analysis has also 
revealed how people carrying Ebola virus moved 
quickly over large distances and through several 
countries (see the Supplementary Appendix).
Grow th of the Epidemic
The speeds at which infection traveled from the 
epicenter to national capitals were quite different 
in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, as were the 
consequences. Conakry was the earliest affected 
capital city (from week 31 of 2014 onward), but 
the case incidence there remained inexplicably 
low throughout the epidemic (Fig. 1B). Ebola was 
reported in Monrovia, Liberia, later than it was 
reported in Conakry but only 3 weeks after cases 
were detected in the north central region of 
Liberia (Fig. 1C). Freetown ultimately bore the 
highest caseload of the three capitals (in terms of 
the number of cases and the number per capita), 
but the rise in case incidence in Western Sierra 
Leone (from week 31 onward) happened a full 
12 weeks later than the incidence in the eastern 
region of the country (Fig. 1D). Neither the speed 
of travel of the virus across each country nor its 
effect on arrival could have been predicted.
The initial incursions from Guinea into Libe-
ria and Sierra Leone, and the spread of infection 
to the capitals, foreshadowed the principal periods 
of epidemic growth in the three countries. These 
periods were characterized by prolonged, expo-
nential increases in the numbers of cases and 
the numbers of infected districts, beginning in 
Sierra Leone in May 2014 (week 20), in Liberia in 
June (week 23), and in Guinea in July (week 29) 
(Fig. 1B, 1C, and 1D). And it was the differences 
in the duration of exponential growth rather than 
the weekly growth rates in case incidence that 
accounted for the eventual sizes of the epidemics 
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in each of the three countries (Fig. 1A). In Sierra 
Leone, where the geographic spread from the 
epicenter to the capital was slowest, the main 
period of growth lasted 22 weeks from the end 
of May (week 22 of 2014) to early November, 
with case incidence doubling every 5.1 weeks 
(Fig. S2 in the Supplementary Appendix). In Libe-
ria, where the movement of infection from epi-
center to capital was faster than in Sierra Leone, 
growth lasted 15 weeks from mid-June (week 
25), with a doubling time of 2.8 weeks. Guinea 
reported the shortest and fastest period of sus-
tained exponential growth — for 9 weeks from 
early July (week 28), mainly in the southeast, with 
the case incidence doubling every 1.9 weeks.
Had exponential growth continued at this pace 
in all three countries, the total number of con-
firmed and probable cases would have exceeded 
20,000 by November 2.10 If growth continued at 
the same rate until early 2015, there would have 
been many more cases.11 It turned out that case 
incidence peaked at 950 confirmed cases in the 
final week of September 2014. The total numbers 
of confirmed cases reported during the epidemic 
were 3358 in Guinea (plus 456 probable cases; 
suspected cases were resolved and not reported), 
3163 in Liberia (1879 probable, 5636 suspected), 
and 8706 in Sierra Leone (287 probable, 5131 
suspected). The numbers of confirmed cases per 
100,000 population were 32, 87, and 137, respec-
tively (with respective population sizes of 10.6 
million, 3.6 million, and 6.4 million people). 
Figure 1. The Ebola Epidemics in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone.
Panel A shows numbers of cases of Ebola virus disease confirmed nationally each week during 2014 and 2015. Panels B, C, and D show 
the weekly numbers of confirmed cases for 10 of 17 regions (administrative level 1) that reported the majority of cases in each country. 
Lines with long dashes denote regions centered on country capitals (Conakry, Monrovia [South Central] and Freetown [Western]), and 
lines with dots denote sites of initial infection (epicenters) in Nzérékoré in southeast Guinea, in north central Liberia, and in eastern 
 Sierra Leone. Lines with short dashes denote other regions that accounted for the majority of cases. (Note the differences in the y-axis 
scales in the panels.)
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Thus, Sierra Leone sustained the worst effects of 
the epidemic as measured by the absolute num-
bers of cases (whether we count only confirmed 
cases or include suspected and probable cases) 
and in terms of the number of cases per capita. 
Despite uncertainties in the accuracy of report-
ing, there were clearly major differences in the 
magnitude of the epidemic and its effect from 
country to country (Fig. 3).
Differences in the growth rates of the epi-
demic among countries and districts reflect dif-
ferences in the average case reproduction num-
bers (the average number of secondary cases 
caused by one case over a generation of Ebola 
infection). The basic reproduction number, R0, 
which holds at the start of an epidemic and be-
fore intervention, has been estimated to lie in the 
range of 1.71 to 2.02 (range of point estimates) 
in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone,10 a range 
that is similar to estimates derived from previous, 
smaller outbreaks of Ebola in central Africa 
(Sudan and Zaire species, 1.3 to 4.7).12 Once 
again, the large variation in the size of the out-
breaks across Africa appears to be governed not 
primarily by differences in R0 but by the period 
of epidemic growth and the size of the popula-
tion at risk.13 In any event, the magnitude of R0
estimates for West Africa, calculated at an early 
stage of the epidemic, indicated that a sustained 
reduction in transmission of more than 50% (i.e., 
by a factor of more than 2) would be enough to 
eliminate infection from the human population. 
Even during a large epidemic, the elimination 
of Ebola virus from the human population is a 
feasible goal.
These average case reproduction numbers con-
ceal much of the variation in the number of in-
fections transmitted by different persons. Both 
epidemiologic (Fig. 4A) and phylogenetic14,15 data 
show that a small minority of cases in one gen-
eration produced the majority of cases in the 
next generation. For Ebola, as for some other 
infectious diseases,16 roughly 20% of cases can 
be considered to be “superspreaders,” being 
sources of infection for about 80% of cases in 
the following generation (Fig. 4A). Thus, the 
average case reproduction numbers determine 
the criterion for the elimination of Ebola from 
most of the population, but pockets of resistance 
can be expected from subpopulations in which 
transmission rates are higher than average.
For Ebola, superspreading is a characteristic 
not only of the number of secondary cases but 
also of geographic dispersal. For example, dur-
ing an outbreak in the fishing community of 
Aberdeen in Freetown during January and Febru-
ary 2015, EVD was confirmed in 24 people, with 
infection apparently acquired from a single 
source. These infections progressed to disease 
over the course of a single incubation period 
(Fig. 4B). A second generation was expected 
within the quarantined community in Aberdeen 
but actually occurred in the Bombali district, 
200 km away, after one infected man fled quar-
antine, visited a traditional healer, died, and was 
buried secretly and unsafely in the village of 
Figure 2. The Dynamics and Distribution of Ebola Virus Disease in West Africa.
Synchronous changes in the incidence of confirmed cases among three pre-
fectures in southwestern Guinea are shown (Panel A, in green); the incidence 
is asynchronous with that in the neighboring district of Kambia in Sierra Leone 
(SL, blue), despite frequent cross-border movement. Periodicity in case in-
cidence (Panel B, 3-day running mean) is shown for Guinea over 115 days, 
from September 12, 2014 (week 37), to January 5, 2015 (week 1). Autocorre-
lation analysis revealed a periodicity of 16 days, reflecting the serial interval 
(or generation) time.
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Rosanda. Throughout this epidemic, the sites 
where new cases would be found, or where trans-
mission would persist, were largely unpredictable.
During the West African epidemic, distinct 
generations of cases were visible on scales large 
and small. The time series of confirmed cases 
from the whole of Guinea compiled during the 
115 days after the main period of exponential 
growth had stopped show a periodicity of 16 
days, which is roughly the serial interval, cover-
ing approximately seven generations of cases 
(Fig. 2B). Clearly, interventions were not effective 
in breaking the cycle of transmission in Guinea 
up to January 2015.
 Effec t of Interventions
The duration of epidemic growth in each region 
of each country, and the number of people at 
risk, were determined in part by the timing and 
magnitude of the interventions against Ebola. 
After the epidemic peak in each country, the 
case incidence declined most quickly in Liberia 
and more slowly in Sierra Leone and Guinea 
An animated map 
with timeline is
available at 
NEJM.org
Figure 3. Geographic Distribution of Confirmed Cases of Ebola Virus Disease in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, 
up to April 10, 2016.
Confirmed cases are coded according to village where possible (60% of cases) and are otherwise coded according to 
county, district, and prefecture (administrative level 2).
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(Fig. S3 in the Supplementary Appendix). It is 
conceivable, but has not been proved, that the 
more explosive spread of infection across Liberia, 
and within the capital of Monrovia, stimulated 
the development of more rapid and effective inter-
ventions than in Guinea and Sierra Leone. In any 
Figure 4. Superspreading of Ebola Virus Disease According to Numbers of Infections and Geographic Distance.
In Panel A, the overdispersed distribution of 287 confirmed secondary cases of Ebola virus disease (EVD) arising 
from primary cases in Conakry, Guinea, is shown at left, with 0 to 8 secondary cases arising from each primary 
case. Approximately 20% of the primary, confirmed cases generated 80% of the secondary cases, shown at right. In 
Panel B, the spread of infection during 2015 in a first generation of confirmed cases in Aberdeen, a coastal neigh-
borhood in Freetown, is shown (top graph). One man with EVD fled Aberdeen for the village of Rosanda in the 
Bombali district, 200 km away from the source of the original outbreak, thereby establishing a second, third, and 
possibly a fourth generation of cases in that village (bottom graph).
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event, it is the differing rates of decline in inci-
dence, rather than the peak incidence rates per 
capita in each country, that explain (at least 
mathematically) why continuous transmission 
ended first in Liberia, then in Sierra Leone, and 
finally in Guinea.
Although vaccination probably helped to re-
duce the rate of transmission after April 2015 in 
Guinea,17 the dominant interventions used have 
been the classic methods of Ebola control: find-
ing symptomatic cases and tracing potentially 
infected contacts; isolating cases, admitting pa-
tients to specially designed Ebola treatment 
centers, and providing supportive clinical care; 
and ensuring safe and dignified burial.18 The 
data supporting the evidence for the effective-
ness of the control measures implemented in 
2013–2016 are observational and circumstantial 
rather than experimental, and the most persua-
sive analyses are those linked to empirical data.
Mathematical modeling19-22 has been used 
to investigate what reduction in transmission, 
achieved by what means, would have been neces-
sary to explain the epidemics in Guinea, Liberia, 
and Sierra Leone. All these modeling analyses 
show, as expected, that admitting patients to 
Ebola treatment centers and shortening the delay 
before hospitalization could have played a large 
part in slowing the increase and accelerating the 
decline in case incidence. In line with the differ-
ing rates of decline in incidence, bed capacity 
was scaled up first in Liberia, then in Sierra 
Leone, and eventually in Guinea (see the Supple-
mentary Appendix).22
Empirical evidence of the effect of rapid pa-
tient isolation and hospitalization comes from 
investigations of a series of small outbreaks in 
Liberia.23-27 Twelve outbreaks were included in a 
study of the Rapid Isolation and Treatment of 
Ebola (RITE) strategy, applied between July and 
November 2014. RITE encourages active case 
finding and contact tracing and the use of prac-
tices that prevent infection when caring for the 
ill and burying the dead. In a comparison of 
the effects of six outbreaks that occurred before 
the introduction of RITE and six that occurred 
afterward, the time between the first new case 
in remote areas and the notification of health 
authorities was reduced by nearly half, the pro-
portion of patients isolated increased from 28% 
to 81%, survival improved from 13% to 50%, the 
case reproduction number fell below unity (the 
replacement rate), outbreaks became shorter 
(median duration declined from 53 to 25 days), 
and the number of generations of cases dropped 
from a median of four to two.26,27 On their own, 
these observations made before and after the 
introduction of RITE do not provide the level of 
evidence afforded by a randomized trial, but they 
are consistent with the larger body of evidence 
on Ebola interventions.
The benefits of rapid case detection and 
prompt patient isolation were also made plain 
during the interruption of transmission at in the 
community of St. Paul’s Bridge in Monrovia, 
between December 2014 and February 2015. The 
numbers of cases in successive generations of 
this transmission chain were 1 (index case), 5, 10, 
6 and 0, with case reproduction numbers (ratios) 
of 5, 2, 0.6, and 0. Over generations 2 through 
4, the average times to detection and isolation 
dropped from 6.0 days to 4.7 days to 1.5 days.28 
There was also an effective, rapid response to an 
EVD outbreak in Lagos, Nigeria, during July 2014, 
which was restricted to just 15 confirmed cases 
in a population of more than 20 million.29-32 
Rapid response has been linked to the success-
ful control of outbreaks elsewhere in Africa.33,34
Although there was also improvement in pa-
tient-contact tracing during 2014 and 2015, this 
improvement occurred later than the expansion 
of Ebola treatment centers in Liberia and Sierra 
Leone (Fig. S4 in the Supplementary Appendix). 
The follow-up of contacts could have been more 
effective in preventing transmission during the 
early stages of this epidemic, had it been thor-
oughly implemented. As it happens, contact trac-
ing appears to have played only a supporting role, 
mainly after case incidence had fallen in 2015.
End of the Epidemic in West Afric a
The epidemic took 10 months to reach peak in-
cidence (September 2014), but cases were reported 
for an additional 18 months (until April 2016), 
and there may be more to come. Although the 
number of new cases was held below 50 per week 
from April 2015 onward (Fig. 1), the outbreaks in 
each country were not declared over until May 9 
in Liberia, November 7 in Sierra Leone, and De-
cember 28 in Guinea. These dates mark 42 days 
(two incubation periods) since the last reported 
case that arose according to the usual route of 
transmission — from one infectious, symptom-
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atic patient with a primary episode of illness to 
another.
In the long tail of the epidemic, foci of trans-
mission persisted for many months during 2015, 
particularly in areas of Sierra Leone and Guinea 
where symptomatic patients were unwilling to 
seek medical care, where contacts of patients fled 
quarantine, and where deaths from EVD were 
followed by unsafe burials (and where case re-
production numbers therefore remained higher 
than average). In addition, after the principal 
chains of transmission had been broken, addi-
tional cases emerged, apparently as a result of 
infections acquired from survivors of EVD. The 
possible mechanisms of transmission in each of 
these events — semen (male to female partner), 
breast milk (mother to child), or clinical relapse 
in a surviving patient (person to person) — are 
still under investigation.4,5,35 The most recent of 
these incidents began with three deaths reported 
on March 17, 2016, in Nzérékoré prefecture in 
southeastern Guinea. The origin of infection was 
a man who survived EVD in November 2014. In 
this outbreak, which generated 13 confirmed and 
probable cases, infection spread from Nzérékoré 
to Macenta prefecture in Guinea and into Mon-
rovia. The persistent risk of infection from sur-
vivors is another reason (in addition to locally 
high rates of transmission) why we can expect 
any large Ebola epidemic to have a protracted 
end, demanding heightened surveillance, with 
routine testing of live and dead persons in whom 
EVD is suspected, for months after an outbreak 
has ended.
Prepar ation for Future Outbreaks
The risk of human infection from animals and 
from Ebola survivors appears to be persistent, 
widespread, and locally unpredictable.36 Even with 
40 years of hindsight (since the first outbreak in 
1976) we cannot fully explain — and thus con-
fidently forecast — the timing, location, and rate 
of spread of EVD outbreaks in Africa. We also do 
not know whether West Africa remains vulner-
able to another large outbreak in 2016 (see the 
Supplementary Appendix). The emphasis must 
therefore be on prevention and preparedness to 
protect populations — that is, to manage resid-
ual risks from survivors of the West African epi-
demic and to contain new outbreaks anytime, 
anywhere in Africa.
Until human exposure to infection can be more 
accurately predicted or prevented, the approach 
to managing future outbreaks will center on the 
classic, responsive approach to Ebola control: 
community engagement, early case detection and 
diagnosis, comprehensive contact tracing, prompt 
patient isolation, supportive clinical care, and 
rigorous infection control, including safe burial. 
During the 2013–2016 West African epidemic, 
this strategy was enhanced but not transformed. 
Accelerated research has begun to deliver a new 
generation of vaccines to prevent infection, rapid 
diagnostic tests for earlier case detection, and 
drugs to improve treatment outcomes.37 There is 
now a deeper appreciation of the importance of 
community engagement that occurs through 
mutual adaptation of local cultural and public 
health practices.38,39 Strong survivor support ser-
vices are critical not only to mitigate the risk of 
further outbreaks but also to provide essential 
clinical care. Standardized data collection and 
reporting on Ebola must be linked to national 
health information systems so that Ebola can be 
managed as part of Africa’s system of integrated 
disease surveillance and response.40
A vital next step is to ensure that there is 
dependable financial support to develop health 
services in the countries at risk for EVD, with a 
focus on primary health care and universal health 
coverage.41 In this context, the $5.91 billion dis-
bursed by 77 donors (out of $8.91 billion 
pledged) during the West African epidemic (Sep-
tember 1, 2014, to October 31, 2015) concentrated 
largely on epidemic response (79% of funds), 
with only 18% targeted at recovery (as compared 
with 40% of funds pledged) and 3% for research 
and development.42 Looking to the future, the 
Commission on a Global Health Risk Framework 
for the Future has underscored the importance 
of resilient national public health services as the 
first line of defense against future epidemics of 
EVD or other diseases.43 The commission recom-
mended substantial additional investment in es-
sential health services: an additional $4.5 billion 
should be spent globally each year, of which $3.4 
billion (87%) should be used for primary preven-
tion and treatment.
In conclusion, the weight of evidence suggests 
that a rapid response to the discovery of new 
Ebola cases can stop transmission, preventing 
minor outbreaks from becoming major epidemics 
in large, mobile populations. The critical question 
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now is how to ensure that populations and their 
health services are ready for the next EVD out-
break, wherever it may occur. Health security 
across Africa and beyond depends on the resourc-
es made available both to strengthen national 
health services and to sustain investment in the 
next generation of technologies for Ebola control.
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